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Nikita Khrushchev’s Support for Developing Regimes in Sub-Saharan Africa from 1955 
to 1964 
 
Stephen West ‘09 
 
 
During the period of colonization, the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa were exploited by 
the colonizing powers for their resources and manpower. After these powers left, the 
countries were rife with poverty and could not set up governments that satisfied their 
people. This paper examines the Soviet Union’s view of potentially revolutionary 
conditions in Sub-Saharan Africa, and how these nations fit into a system of class 
consciousness that was the basis for Marxist-Leninist communism. Nikita Khrushchev’s 
foreign policy expanded Soviet influence in these nations by offering aid in order to 
promote communist national liberation movements. This foreign aid was controversial 
both in the Soviet Union as well as the rest of the world, and was ultimately discontinued 
after Khrushchev was overthrown. Was this aid successful in promoting communist 
revolutions, or was it a waste of Soviet resources? 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
“The Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union supports the just struggle of the 
countries of Asia, Africa and Latin 
America against imperialism and the 
oppression of the multinational 
monopolies and advocates the 
assertion of the sovereign right to 
control one’s own resources, the 
restructuring of international relations 
on an equal, democratic basis, the 
creation of a new economic order, and 
deliverance from the debt shackles 
imposed by the imperialists.”1 
 
 Since the Second Party Congress 
in 1920, the Soviet Union has always 
expressed an interest in national 
liberation movements worldwide. Prior to 
                                                
1 William Kintner. Soviet Global Strategy. (Fairfax: 
Hero Books, 1987), 67. 
World War II however, the Soviet Union 
was preoccupied with developing the 
communist system first within the Soviet 
Union and then to Europe before 
spreading the message to post-colonial 
states. Indeed, there were fewer nation-
states in the world before World War II, 
and any foreign aid to these countries, 
regardless of motivation, would be viewed 
by the colonizing power as supporting 
insurgencies. After the war and in the late 
1950s, the Soviet Union was finally in a 
political and economic position to 
support socialist beliefs in the newly 
liberated Third World. Nikita 
Khrushchev, who rose to power in 1954, 
changed the Soviet Union’s role in the 
Third World greatly. He brought about 
two major shifts in strategic thinking. 
First, in contrast to Josef Stalin, 
Khrushchev supported an ally-based 
global strategy, believing that the USSR 
could and should persuade countries in 
the developing world to embrace a more 
1
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socialist economic and political structure. 
This theoretically would lead to more 
allies in the world able to contain 
potential Western imperial 
expansionism. Second, Khrushchev 
ideologically redefined national liberation 
movements, so that they were not 
understood by the USSR as local wars. 
These shifts in policy are Khrushchev’s 
legacy. The first part of this paper is 
about the revolutionary conditions in 
Africa that spurred Soviet interest in the 
region, and then what their opinions 
were on how they could ideologically 
promote socialist development within 
each state. The second part of the paper 
expands upon how the Soviets promoted 
this development through military and 
economic aid, and what the 
corresponding reaction was to these aid 
programs. 
 
Revolutionary Conditions in Sub-
Saharan Africa 
The conditions that led to the 
emergence of national liberation 
movements were the natural 
consequences of colonialism as a system 
of imperialist exploitation. The Leninist 
argument is that Western imperialist 
regimes introduced capitalism to the 
colonies, which were unaware of the 
consequences it entailed. This system was 
often harsher than the capitalist economy 
within the colonizing state, and Lenin 
argued that colonizing states intentionally 
exported the harshest aspects of 
capitalism in order to placate domestic 
proletariats prone to radicalization. 
However, unlike the Western nation 
itself, the colonies were forced militarily 
to submit to a system that they were not 
ready for and did not understand. 
Consequently, this level of capitalist 
subjugation spawned a cycle of 
exploitation, impoverishment, and 
dissatisfaction on the part of the 
colonized peoples.2 Since the primary 
economic strategy for the colonizers was 
to exploit the colony’s natural resources 
as much as possible to send back to the 
home country, there was little focus on 
building infrastructure that would help 
the colonized peoples. Additionally, there 
were few checks on the governments and 
corporations that were operating within 
these colonies, and as a result, oppressive 
working conditions were instituted in 
order to produce as much as possible. 
This ruthless exported capitalism created 
a dichotomy between the interests of the 
Western colonizer and the interests of 
the people within the colony itself. 
However, since the Western nation was 
stronger militarily than the colony was, its 
interests took precedence. In order to 
maintain a stable society in which the 
workers would continue to help the 
Western nation, the colonizer had to 
instill values of subservience into the 
culture. They achieved these ends by 
corrupting the nation with national 
nihilism, which was achieved through 
institutional oppression of the natives. 
According to the Soviet theorists, 
“colonial domination with its plunder 
and violence, racial discrimination and 
scorn for the culture of the 
people…inevitably gave rise to the growth 
of nationalism.”3 This corruption of the 
nation served the colonizers’ ends 
effectively until their activities led to the 
growth of nationalist movements. 
                                                
2 Galia Golan. The Soviet Union and National 
Liberation Movements in the Third World. (Boston: 
Unwin Hyman, 1988), 25.  
 
3 Golan, 25. 
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Over the period of Khrushchev’s 
reign, there were many internal debates 
within the Soviet Union over what 
qualified as a national liberation 
movement. These debates continued 
until the late 1960s, where the Soviet 
government came to a consensus that 
national liberation movements in the 
developing world were primarily based on 
socio-ethnic tensions rather than socio-
economic tensions. This consensus was a 
major issue at the time, since this was a 
departure from Marxist-Leninism, where 
only an oppressed economic class could 
rise up. However, this departure led to a 
belief that those who were white 
controlled the means of economic 
development, while the black natives 
were the cogs in the machine. This 
distinction, as argued by the Soviet 
theorists, meant that socioeconomic 
differences were co-opted into the belief 
structure of the colonized peoples: white 
meant rich and black meant poor.4 This 
hierarchical structure reinforced the 
system of exploitation through national 
nihilism because the oppressed peoples 
believed they could not progress 
economically because of their race. In 
addition, as stated previously, ethnic 
groups in these colonies taught backward 
social beliefs and relationships in order to 
stifle any potential threats to the 
colonizer. They achieved this through 
institutionalized racism, resistance to 
demands for education, and humiliation 
and destruction of a colonial people’s 
cultural values. 
In order to maintain stability 
within the colony, certain values were 
perpetuated by making the natives feel 
inferior to the West and treating them as 
second-class citizens. These beliefs were 
                                                
4 Golan, 27. 
spread primarily through two means. The 
primary means of enforcing these 
distinctions was through the education 
system, where natives were taught very 
little of their own customs and history, 
instead focusing on the West and its 
superiority in the world. As a result, 
those who were lucky enough even to 
receive an education were given a 
Western-centric viewpoint of the world 
where they did not fit in.5 This affected 
the identities of these ethnic groups 
irreversibly. Consequently, natives were 
manipulated into thinking that the West 
was the benevolent entity that had come 
to save them from themselves. The 
second means of oppression was 
restricting native participation in local 
and colonial government. This particular 
means of exploitation, along with 
Western-centric education, created a 
distinction between the governing and 
the governed; perpetuating a feeling of 
oppression and helplessness on the part 
of the natives.6 The colonial laws were 
sustainable only if the colonizers stayed in 
each colony ad infinitum. At the time of 
liberation however, the West left the 
developing world with depleted 
resources, an oppressed people, and no 
means for the ethnic groups to govern 
themselves effectively. Additionally, even 
when the West left the colonies, most 
means of economic development were 
left in the hands of Westerners who 
decided to stay in the colony.7 Since this 
bourgeois exploitation occurred between 
the colonizer and colonized both before 
and after liberation, the only logical 
solution was to overthrow the foreigners 
both from the Western colonizers and 
                                                
5 Golan, 28. 
6 Golan, 27. 
7 Golan, 32. 
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those seeking to perpetuate the colonial 
laws once the Western nation left. 
 This institutionalized racism that 
was so pervasive in both education and 
the governmental bureaucracy that it was 
also extended to every other facet of 
society in order to destroy the will of 
those who might oppose the colonizing 
power. The purpose of this was to 
oppress the natives into complete 
submission. In institutionalized racism, 
resistance to education, and the 
humiliation and destruction of cultural 
values, the West was very successful. Even 
after the Western powers left, lingering 
foreigners continued to perpetuate these 
values, but without the same amount of 
power as the former colonizer. As a 
result, nationalist movements recognized 
this weakness, and sought to take 
advantage of it.8  
As an element in colonial 
liberation, national liberation movements 
sought to overthrow the main source of 
power in each former colony: 
perpetuation of the colonial Western 
legacy through increasingly oppressive 
foreign-dominated governments. In order 
to form meaningful opposition to these 
forms of governments, oppressed natives 
formed national liberation organizations 
to seize power from the illegitimate 
government and return it to the 
colonized peoples.9 While these 
organizations were not always communist 
or socialist, almost all of them had to use 
populist ideas to attract a large 
following.10 These populist ideas became 
the basis for African Socialism, which 
used populist ideas of rising up against a 
foreign oppressor to fuel nationalist 
                                                
8 Golan, 25. 
9 Golan, 31. 
10 Golan, 49. 
campaigns for independence. African 
Socialism appealed to the national 
identity of the oppressed Africans, and 
stressed cultural unity over opposition to 
capitalism. The USSR, even though this 
was a departure from Marxism-Leninism, 
strived to support these groups. 
These national liberation 
movements reflected the current state of 
pre-capitalist society in these developing 
nations. In the previous section, 
numerous conditions were elucidated 
that show a clear potential for 
revolutionary ideals. Primarily, the 
humiliation of cultural ideals was the 
greatest source for discontent throughout 
classes, and therefore, all social classes 
had motivation to change the system. As 
explained earlier, this overwhelming 
oppression had the effect of co-opting 
socioeconomic struggle within a socio-
ethnic dichotomy. Consequently, 
separation of populations tended to be 
along tribal or religious lines, instead of 
the economic lines that the Soviet Union 
hoped for.11 Since tribal and religious 
identity was the primary means of societal 
organization in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
colonialism was “accused of purposely 
fostering the persistence of the traditional 
social structure so as to prevent 
progressive development.”12 As a result, 
the USSR saw itself in a unique position 
to try to foster this development through 
support of socialist uprisings and 
movements. 
 
Soviet Framework of Post-Colonial 
Theory 
In the years immediately 
following World War II, the Politburo of 
the Soviet Union was debating what role 
                                                
11 Golan, 48. 
12 Golan, 48. 
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the USSR should have in the world. 
However, until 1953, foreign policy 
strategy was largely dominated by Josef 
Stalin’s personal thoughts on the nature 
of the Soviet system. His strategy was to 
focus on building a strong socialist state 
in the USSR and the countries the Soviet 
Union already had sway over before 
exporting the system to other nations, 
namely the developing world.13 However, 
after his death in 1953, his successor, 
Nikita Khrushchev, re-evaluated that 
policy in order to support his own ideas 
for expansionism. In his speech to the 
22nd Party Congress, he explicitly stated 
that it was the job of the Soviet Union to 
liberate regimes from the imperialist 
West and support their desire for 
freedom through peaceful uprising and a 
socialist system.14 Thus, the USSR started 
to increase its military and economic aid 
to regimes that were just emerging from 
the colonial system, mainly in Africa and 
Southeast Asia. 
During Nikita Khrushchev’s time 
in office, a dramatic shift was taking 
effect in the developing world. The 
colonial powers were liberating their 
colonies at a dramatic rate; as a result, the 
number of independent countries in the 
world swelled. However, the colonial 
empires were not always prudent in how 
they liberated the colonies. There were 
frequent disputes over who held 
legitimate power once the West left; 
therefore, countries were in constant civil 
war.15 The Soviet Union felt that 
nationalist movements needed to be 
based on class loyalties, rather than tribal 
                                                
13 Golan, 16. 
14 Gu Guan-Fu. “Soviet Aid to the Third World: 
an Analysis of Its Strategy.” Soviet Studies, 35, 1 
(1983): 1. 
15 Golan, 26. 
affiliations, in order to fill the power 
vacuum and have a functioning 
government.16 The Capitalist West had 
no systemic opinion on the issue; besides, 
they wanted to leave a system that was 
growing more unstable by the day. Since 
the former colonizers were not there to 
offer help to the fledgling nations, the 
USSR decided that it was their duty to 
step in and create regimes that would not 
only be stable, but provide a free, 
communist system for the citizens, 
regardless of tribal loyalties and previous 
power hierarchies. 
In order to provide this support 
that would help these post-colonial states, 
the Soviet Union needed a framework to 
evaluate how the Soviet model of class 
revolution applied to countries where 
there was not a history of class struggle. 
The Soviets had to first define what a 
nation is in order to be able to 
consolidate essentially separate tribes into 
a broader national identity. The 
definition that prevailed was Stalin’s 
1913 writings on the subject, that a 
nation was “a historically evolved, stable 
community of people, formed on the 
basis of a common language, territory, 
economic life, and psychic make-up 
manifested in a common culture.”17 This 
definition was broad enough to 
encompass emerging nations in the 
developing world, and thus created a 
justification for Nikita Khrushchev’s 
renewed interest in promoting national 
liberation movements. Ostensibly, 
nations that had class separation and 
tension were more ripe for socialist 
revolution, but Khrushchev started a 
dialogue in the Soviet Union about 
whether states that had yet to 
                                                
16 Golan, 46. 
17 Golan, 16. 
5
West: Nikita Khrushchev’s Support for Developing Regimes in Sub-Saharan
Published by Digital Commons @ Colgate, 2012
 229 
industrialize were capable of supporting 
socialist government and economic 
structures.18  
This dialogue ensued with Soviet 
conservatives, who believed that only 
through socioeconomic factors and 
tension could emerging nations support 
these structures. The conservatives argued 
that in order to emerge as a socialist 
nation, there had to be property 
ownership and commodity exchange 
within the system to break down tribal 
bonds and create class identity. They 
argued that a majority of Africa was still 
broken down into pre-capitalist societies, 
so class identities did not exist yet. The 
key to creating class consciousness is 
industrial development, which Africa did 
not have.19 The other side of the debate 
consisted of theorists who took the 
ethnic-psychological approach. The latter 
group believed that socioeconomic class 
differences were not as important as the 
feeling of oppression and the inability to 
control a process that was exploitative to 
a large majority of the colonized peoples. 
The ethnic-psychological theorists argued 
that the Western colonizers took the 
form of a capitalist bourgeoisie and that 
they were fighting a system that was even 
more repressive than the Czarist system 
the Soviets replaced.20 The Politburo by 
1959 felt that class identity is also formed 
by the environmental variables that exist 
within a system, and since the economic 
structure occurred in multiple nations at 
the same time, the oppressed needed help 
in order to rise up and defeat a system 
                                                
18 Daniel Kempton. Soviet Strategy Towards 
Southern Africa: The National Liberation Movement 
Connection. (New York: Praeger, 1989), 24. 
19 Golan, 17. 
20 Golan, 22. 
that had much more power than them.21 
As a result, the Politburo came to the 
conclusion in 1959 that the USSR, 
instead of debating theoretical ideology, 
should start actively courting these 
leaders in order to see how development 
would actually take place. 
 
Support for the Developing World and 
Global Implications 
In the late 1950s, the geopolitical 
climate was changing drastically. 
Specifically, more nations were coming 
into existence because of rapid 
decolonization; it seemed that multiple 
new countries were created overnight, 
and the global system had to embrace 
them in order for the fledgling nations to 
survive. Nikita Khrushchev was 
“enchanted and mesmerized” by the 
process, and it “[stirred] old memories of 
the revolutionary passions of the Civil 
War” for him.22 He saw this as a chance 
to surpass the West, specifically the 
United States, by wooing these nations 
over to the Communist bloc. 
Khrushchev’s stance on the developing 
world was also developed when he saw 
the amount of opportunity available to 
the Soviet Union. Instead of labeling 
these emerging nations as the “3rd 
World,” he relabeled them “                 ,” 
which, according to him, acknowledged 
their struggle for freedom and economic 
prosperity.23 Indeed, in a speech given on 
January 6th, 1961, he pledges support to 
all of these nations in their quest for 
prosperity and independence. 
                                                
21 Golan, 16. 
22Constantine Pleshakov and Vladislav Zubok. 
Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War: From Stalin to 
Khrushchev. (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1996), 206. 
23 Kempton, 3. 
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Khrushchev invoked Lenin’s Imperialism 
to justify his stance, stating that 
“communists are revolutionary and it 
would be a bad thing if they did not 
exploit new opportunities.”24 However, 
many other officials in the Communist 
Party were wary of his stance towards 
these developing nations; many viewed 
Khrushchev’s policies as too idealistic 
and not grounded in rationalism.25 Many 
of them had a point, as Khrushchev at 
that point had not developed a strategy 
for the Soviet Union to follow regarding 
national liberation movements. It was 
only later that he solidified his strategy, 
thereby persuading more officials to 
support his efforts in the developing 
world. 
After his initial pledge of support 
to the emerging nations, Khrushchev had 
to find a way for the Soviet Union to 
justify its support for socialist revolution 
in the developing world and not provoke 
the rage of the United States and Europe. 
The first goal he approached was by using 
an “ally strategy” to justify supporting 
these emerging states.26 This ally strategy 
stated that any country that was vocally 
anti-West was automatically an ally of the 
USSR. While the Soviet Union would 
not directly intervene in a nation that 
held this position, they were more than 
willing to offer military and economic aid 
to these states. This strategy was helpful 
to both the developing nation and the 
Soviet Union; the developing nation was 
free to develop its own institutions free of 
Soviet interference, and the Soviet Union 
was only there to serve as a lender of aid, 
not to control the state itself. Indeed, the 
example of Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana 
                                                
24 Zubok and Pleshakov, 208. 
25 Zubok and Pleshakov, 206. 
26 Kempton, 23. 
illustrates this point: Ghana’s vehement 
opposition to the West made cooperation 
with any country in the West not only 
embarrassing, but impossible.27 
Therefore, in order to build up his 
country, Nkrumah had to ask the 
communist bloc for its support, which it 
gladly provided. Khrushchev actively 
courted leaders like Nkrumah, Sekou 
Touré in Guinea, and Modibo Keita in 
Mali; he thought they were reliable and 
could be persuaded to develop along a 
Marxist-Leninist model. This potential 
for persuasion again underlined the 
USSR’s ally strategy because each country 
was allowed initially to develop its own 
version of socialism, not import the 
Soviet model in its entirety. Khrushchev 
believed in the late 1950s, when he just 
started courting these leaders, that if a 
few countries implemented any socialist 
reforms successfully, eventually an 
indigenous form of Afro-Socialism, 
propped up by the Soviet Union, would 
emerge and spread throughout the 
continent.  
The second step in Khrushchev’s 
strategy was how to define national 
liberation movements in the context of 
conflict. After the Cuban Missile Crisis 
of 1962, Khrushchev was afraid of a 
nuclear exchange, and felt that he had to 
show that national liberation movements 
were just, as opposed to Soviet meddling 
in proxy nations.28 While this 
classification could be interpreted as 
being irrelevant, the United States 
welcomed this new classification; it allows 
them to see the USSR’s motivations in 
each nation as not necessarily military 
                                                
27 Kempton, 23. 
28 Mark Katz. The Third World in Soviet Military 
Thought. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1982), 17. 
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buildups. This in turn allowed the U.S. 
to pare down potential military 
commitments in Sub-Saharan Africa and 
instead open up trade ties, which might 
have swayed potentially socialist states 
towards the Western bloc. This also made 
U.S. supported local wars seem less 
legitimate because they did not 
distinguish between local war and 
national liberation movements. 
Khrushchev developed a 
viewpoint on war that was broken down 
into three categories: world war, local 
war, and national liberation movements. 
World war was similar to World War I 
and II, where multiple great powers 
fought each other with the full extent of 
their military. After the bombings of 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, this presumably 
also meant that nuclear weapons would 
be used to achieve military ends.29 This 
was the worst option for the USSR 
because the Soviet Union had not yet 
reached parity in nuclear weaponry to the 
United States, and also because at this 
point the Soviet Union was unable to 
project its military across continents 
quickly enough to respond to an attack 
from the United States. If there was to be 
a world war, the Soviet Union would 
quickly be decimated.  
Local war was war that occurred 
between two non-Western or non-
Communist bloc nations. This would be 
a war in which nuclear weapons could 
not be justifiably used, and only minor 
support, not full military support, would 
be offered by the two superpowers.30 
However, Khrushchev was still hesitant to 
say that the USSR would be supporting a 
certain party in local war; if the conflict 
spread, it was possible for the United 
                                                
29 Katz, 18. 
30 Katz, 19. 
States to enter the war, thereby creating a 
world war. This was a distinct possibility, 
as the United States shifted to a policy of 
“containment” (i.e. supporting multiple 
local wars) to repel Soviet advances after 
the Soviet Union gained second-strike 
nuclear capabilities.31 This shift in U.S. 
policy was regarded by the Soviet Union 
to be a victory; since the U.S. could not 
win a war head to head with the Soviet 
Union. However, the Soviets were still 
cautious about these local wars. Soviet 
rhetoric increasingly shifted to the idea 
that local wars could lead to world wars 
in order to deter the United States from 
continuing to support these seemingly 
minor “inter-state conflicts.”32 This focus 
on deterrence shows that the Soviet 
Union was trying to prevent these local 
wars from evolving into world war 
because in the event of a long world war, 
the Soviet Union could not compete with 
the United States. In spite of this belief, 
Maoist China pressured Khrushchev to 
support these wars more than the Soviet 
Communist Party was willing to. 
Khrushchev disagreed that the Soviet 
Union should provide more support; he 
felt that the Maoist regime was not 
looking at the rational consequences that 
could result from an escalation of local 
war.33 The Soviet Union’s policy would 
still be containing Western imperialism, 
but they would not risk nuclear war in 
the process. Therefore, Khrushchev had 
to create a separate classification for wars 
of national liberation in order to justify 
any economic or military support for Sub-
Saharan Africa that could be construed as 
offering aid for local wars. 
                                                
31 Katz, 20. 
32 Katz, 21. 
33 Katz, 18. 
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Khrushchev argued that these 
wars of national liberation were quite 
unique from local war and world war and 
that by supporting them, the Soviet 
Union was taking a shortcut towards 
worldwide communism. This support for 
the ideology was unwavering even when 
frustration over the efficacy of the Soviet 
aid set in during 1963-1964.34 The main 
ideological challenge for the USSR was 
how these local communist parties within 
each of these emerging nations would 
achieve their goals. Prior to 1959, these 
parties were non-existent; colonizing 
regimes would crack down on them as 
anti-establishment groups and punish all 
of the supporters. Therefore, in 1959-
1960, Khrushchev’s main goal was to 
develop these parties sufficiently enough 
so they could be a powerful force in the 
country’s domestic politics.35 
Additionally, Khrushchev felt that the 
Soviet Union could expect allegiance 
because of the aid the USSR was offering 
them. In reality, however, once they 
achieved sufficient power, many of them 
wanted armed conflict. They tried to 
persuade the Soviet Union to give them 
military aid, but the Soviet Union took 
much more of a rational standpoint. 
Arguing that armed socialist coups could 
trigger support from the West for the 
regimes in power, the USSR advocated 
that these parties work within the 
bourgeois-led movements and regimes.36 
Even though these bourgeois nationalist 
regimes were antithetical to Marxist-
Leninist theory, the Soviet Union felt 
that the bourgeoisie in Africa were more 
                                                
34 Katz, 23. 
35Arthur Jay Klinghoffer. The Soviet Union and 
Africa. Edited by Roger E. Kanet. (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974), 56. 
36 Kempton, 23. 
progressive than those in the 
industrialized world.37 They had seen 
hardship, they were oppressed, and most 
importantly, they were willing to rise up 
to overthrow the remnants of the 
colonizing regime. Khrushchev, and the 
theorists who supported him, argued that 
in the case of Africa, a national 
bourgeoisie could skip the capitalist 
phase of development all together and 
create a socialist state with a decidedly 
African type of socialism.38 An oft-cited 
example within Soviet policy meetings 
was Cuba, which proved that an 
indigenous progressive bourgeoisie could 
successfully create a socialist regime from 
a post-colonial state.39 In Africa 
specifically, the rise of Sekou Touré in 
Guinea and Kwame Nkrumah shows that 
bourgeois leaders could effectively rally 
worker-bourgeois parties towards a more 
socialist orientation. However, even 
though the Soviet Union encouraged the 
communist parties to work within these 
bourgeois-led movements, they were 
skeptical of the continued reliability of 
the national bourgeoisie.40 Communists 
were told to spread their message within 
the bureaucracy, but also in the other 
groups that were integral to the 
nationalist cause: the intelligentsia and 
the army. These groups provided more 
ideology and firepower than the 
bourgeoisie had, and therefore it was 
imperative that the communist parties 
                                                
37 Kempton, 5. 
38 Francis Fukuyama. Soviet Strategy in the Third 
World. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), 
27. 
39Michael Radu and Arthur Jay Klinghoffer. The 
Dynamics of Soviet Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
(New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers, 1991), 
2. 
40 Kempton, 5. 
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fight for their support.41 Soviet policy-
makers and theorists believed that 
eventually, with enough loyal 
communists in the nationalist movement, 
the movement would take a decidedly 
socialist turn. In practice, however, these 
bourgeois-led movements did not always 
accept these communists in their midst, 
so from 1962 until Khrushchev’s ousting 
in 1964, the USSR stressed radicalization 
of nationalist parties, rather than creating 
more local communist parties.42 
Once the movement theoretically 
became socialist either through 
radicalization of nationalist parties or 
communist party infiltration, it was 
necessary to keep the movement within 
one country initially in order to minimize 
the chances of United States support. It 
was thought that the United States could 
not deny the will of the people, and 
therefore they would not support a 
regime that continued to oppress a 
majority of the people. In fact, Soviet aid 
was contingent on the movement staying 
within one country; it would stop if 
conflict branched out to other states.43 
This policy was again to minimize 
antagonism of the West; the Soviets 
wanted to achieve their goals as 
peacefully as possible. This classification 
of national liberation movements as a 
concept separate from local war did have 
results: the United States could not 
outwardly support these collapsing 
regimes and had to resort to espionage 
and covert action to achieve their 
objectives in the region.44 To the Soviet 
Union, this was seen as a great success; 
they were able to simultaneously support 
                                                
41 Kempton, 5. 
42 Klinghoffer, 58. 
43 Katz, 23. 
44 Katz, 26. 
emerging socialist regimes, prevent war 
with the United States, and marginalize 
U.S. influence in Sub-Saharan Africa all 
at the same time. 
 
Soviet Support for Individual Regimes 
and Movements 
Political maneuvering by 
Khrushchev allowed the Soviet Union to 
provide aid and have close diplomatic ties 
with many emerging nations. As outlined 
previously, there were many ideological 
reasons for wanting to have good 
relations with these nations; the new 
allies could help legitimize communism 
in the rest of the world, a goal which the 
USSR was hoping to achieve. In addition 
to these ideological reasons, the USSR 
also had many practical reasons for 
expanding their influence in the 
developing world. The developing world 
offered many opportunities for the Soviet 
Union with few restrictions and low 
risk.45 Strategically, they would be able to 
deny the West (and an increasingly 
hostile People’s Republic of China) 
access to the remaining resources that 
Sub-Saharan Africa had to offer. Even 
though the Western colonizers had taken 
as many resources as possible during 
colonization, there were many other 
resources that were still largely untapped 
that could affect the West, specifically oil 
and uranium. This drive for resources 
was essential for the Soviet Union; it 
meant that they had more resources to 
fuel their military and economy while 
simultaneously depriving the West and 
China.46 Because modern-day militaries 
were vulnerable to disruptions in 
resources, it was imperative that the 
USSR hold these resources either directly 
                                                
45 Kintner, 67. 
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or through proxy regimes.47 
Unfortunately, the Soviet Union pulled 
out of Sub-Saharan Africa in frustration 
before this access to resources was fully 
realized. Until their pullout, this resource 
focus, along with the ally strategy, was the 
main reason other than ideology that the 
Soviet Union used to justify supporting 
national liberation movements. 
The two primary ways that the 
Soviet Union supported these liberation 
movements were through military and 
economic aid. As stated previously, 
Khrushchev felt that if the Soviet Union 
was generous with its aid, it would be 
able to persuade regimes to reform 
politically towards a socialist orientation. 
In fact, Khrushchev even devised a 
formula, stating that “if 40% of the 
foreign trade of the newly independent 
country could be captured by the Soviet 
Union, then that country could be forced 
to become socialist.”48 
 
Military Aid 
The USSR began arming Sub-
Saharan African states in 1958, when the 
Soviet Union set up diplomatic ties with 
the socialist-leaning regimes of Kwame 
Nkrumah in Ghana and Sekou Touré in 
Guinea.49 At the time, the Soviet Union 
frequently announced its support for 
national liberation movements; however, 
they were not very specific in what they 
were offering.50 Soviet arms transfers were 
even more difficult to track. Unlike 
economic aid, arms transfers are more 
high profile internationally and could 
instigate backlash against the USSR. 
Consequently, there are few hard 
                                                
47 Kintner, 67. 
48 Guan-Fu, 1. 
49 Radu and Klinghoffer, 31. 
50 Katz, 31. 
statistics on how many shipments of arms 
were given to certain countries. 
Additionally, this lack of statistics also 
shows that the USSR was not entirely 
forthcoming about their support for these 
regimes; there is a large difference 
between verbal support and actual 
willingness and ability to provide arms to 
these countries.51 
That being said, the Soviet Union 
did give a substantial amount of military 
aid to the region. Even though there was 
a dispute with China over how much 
military aid to give each regime (this 
disagreement contributed to the Sino-
Soviet Split), the Soviet Union did not 
want to give so much aid that it could be 
perceived that they were arming regimes 
for conflict.52 The total amount of 
military aid given to Africa from the years 
1955-1964 was $735 million, a 
respectable sum, but nowhere close to the 
amount of aid given by the U.S. to 
Africa.53 This figure represented 10% of 
the total Soviet aid given to the 
developing world during the same period 
of time.54 
Developing nations, especially 
those which had only tenuous ties to the 
Soviet Union during the Khrushchev era, 
also intentionally used Soviet military aid 
to balance their dependence on Western 
economic or military aid.55 It was an 
attractive option for them; the Soviets 
offered reasonable prices, low interest 
rates, and flexible payment. Often, 
African regimes postponed payment for 
multiple years in order to have the 
weapons but not tell the world that they 
                                                
51 Katz, 31. 
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were being armed by the USSR.56 The 
Soviet Union ultimately accepted this 
rationale; they were simply trying to gain 
influence in these regimes.57 Because aid 
and courteous diplomatic ties allow for 
other ties, such as increased trade, the 
Soviet Union was more than happy to 
defer payments by African elites. 
Not only was it cheaper to buy 
weapons from the Soviet Union, but 
African regimes preferred the Soviet’s 
weapons to Western armaments. In the 
Khrushchev era, the majority of weapons 
supplied to these Sub-Saharan African 
regimes were either surplus weapons or 
older models being phased out from the 
military. While many other developing 
nations (specifically in the Middle East) 
did not want these weapons, African 
nations preferred them because they were 
much simpler to use.58 This simplicity 
allowed them to arm more than just the 
military. The military aspect of national 
liberation movements was not always 
fought by trained armies; a majority of 
the time they were fought by peasants, 
workers, and other peoples with limited 
military and technical knowledge. 
Therefore, it was better for them to use 
an AK-47, which had a reputation for 
never breaking or jamming, than a U.S.-
manufactured counterpart.59 In addition 
to providing equipment that the armies 
actually needed, in Guinea, the USSR 
equipped the three thousand man army 
with mobile anti-tank guns, which served 
no useful purpose other than for parades. 
By providing the Guineans with high-tech 
equipment, the Soviets were then 
legitimized in creating a Russian military 
                                                
56 Radu and Klinghoffer, 31. 
57 Kempton, 23. 
58 Radu and Klinghoffer, 31. 
59 Radu and Klinghoffer, 31. 
training facility at Camp Alpha Yaya, 
which was staffed at all times by forty-five 
men.60 
In addition to providing weapons, 
the Soviet Union was also instrumental 
in providing military and technical 
advisors for these nations to use. They 
were unwilling to provide ground troops, 
since this would be viewed as hostile by 
the West, but non-combat roles were 
often staffed by Soviets.61 In Guinea, 
there were over 1500 military advisors 
(mostly engineers) for a three thousand 
man army. While the Soviet Union was 
reluctant to send in ground troops, the 
Cubans were particularly willing to lend 
soldiers to liberation movements. Che 
Guevara lent his guerilla fighting 
expertise to the socialist fighters under 
Patrice Lumumba in Zaire starting in 
1964.62 Even though he was frustrated by 
the incompetence of the soldiers he was 
working with, he was ultimately able to 
set up infrastructure for later successes in 
the Republic of Congo. African nations 
were impressed with Cuban military 
support; as opposed to organizing grand 
strategy, Cuban fighters, including 
Guevara, were on the frontlines.63 This 
dedication to the cause showed African 
governments how much communist 
states were willing to help. Due to this 
support from communist regimes such as 
Cuba, the Soviet Union was better able 
to help national liberation movements 
while at the same time not angering the 
United States. 
                                                
60 William Atwood. The Reds and the Blacks: A 
Personal Adventure. (New York: Harper & Row 
Publishers, 1967), 69. 
61 Radu and Klinghoffer, 32. 
62Ernesto “Che” Guevara. The African Dream: The 
Diaries of the Revolutionary War in the Congo. (New 
York: Grove Press, 2000), xxi. 
63 Guevara, xxii. 
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Economic Aid 
 The Soviet Union felt that while 
military aid was important, economic aid 
would be most helpful in their process of 
trying to influence elites. The 
primary motivation on the part of the 
Soviet Union was to reduce Western 
dominance of trade relations with the 
developing world.64 In order to compete 
with the West, the USSR had to seek out 
as many resources as possible for their 
own development and deny those 
resources to the United States. This 
primary motivation was accompanied by 
the ideological desire to influence elites 
to join the socialist cause. The policy 
makers in the Kremlin felt that the 
Soviets would receive the most potential 
support if they focused on building 
infrastructure. They argued that this 
would send a message to the developing 
regime that the Soviet Union was 
interested in the country’s development 
as a whole, rather than being interested 
solely in the inherent benefits for the 
USSR.65 While this was the model for 
development aid, oftentimes the Soviets 
received more out of the exchange than 
the nation receiving the aid. This 
development aid was divided into two 
categories: industrial development and 
infrastructure development. Industrial 
development was focused on building 
large factories that could support many 
workers; they would lay the basis for later 
socialist development.66 To not seem 
contradictory, the Soviet Politburo 
decided that they could only legitimately 
give aid to the state economic sector; 
otherwise they would be supporting 
                                                
64 Radu and Klinghoffer, 15. 
65 Radu and Klinghoffer, 16. 
66 Radu and Klinghoffer, 16. 
capitalist development. In Guinea, the 
Soviets did not think about cost; they 
were more concerned with creating a 
communist foothold in the country. 
Therefore, if the Guineans asked for 
anything, the Soviets would invest in it. 
The results of this policy were disastrous. 
Soviet projects included an unsuccessful 
experimental rice plantation, which cost 
$4 million, and a $1 million railroad 
survey where the only results were that 
Soviet trains could not fit on Guinean 
track beds. A Soviet tomato cannery was 
built in the city of Mamou, ignoring the 
fact that there was no water and no 
tomatoes in the area.  A shoe factory had 
twice the capacity of Guinea’s market for 
shoes. All of these projects were 
financially disastrous and politically 
embarrassing for the USSR.67  
Infrastructure development was 
focused on roads, hospitals, and 
stadiums, which helped the people of the 
country in very immediate ways. These 
“prestige projects” were expensive for the 
Soviet Union, and ultimately they were 
not enough to convince a majority of 
people in these nations that the Soviet 
Union was a valued ally.68 To put these 
development projects in perspective, the 
USSR offered $90 million in aid to these 
regimes in just the year 1964.69 In Guinea 
alone, the Soviet Union offered $35 
million in aid in August 1959, and an 
extension of $21.5 million in September 
1960.70 By 1961, they offered an 
additional $100 million aid package and 
started ramping up infrastructure 
development in the nation. Conakry, the 
capital, was the site of a new Polytechnic 
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Institute for 1600 students (where only 
fifty students in the country qualified to 
attend), a printing plant that never 
produced more than 5% of capacity, a 
100-kw radio station that never worked 
because it was built over a deposit of iron 
ore, and a $1 million outdoor theater 
project and a multi-million dollar seaside 
hotel complex that were both abandoned 
during construction. Other projects 
included a 25,000 seat sports stadium for 
Conakry, with a population of 100,000 
people, and an airport for the national 
airline equipped with nine grounded 
Ilyushin aircraft, with radar systems that 
were left to deteriorate in the African 
heat. Deterioration also plagued the 
buses and trucks that the USSR provided 
the Guineans. Since the Guinean drivers 
could not read the Russian manuals, 
trucks and buses were driven into ditches 
when even the most minor repair was 
necessary. After this occurred, the 
Guineans would complain that the 
vehicles were junk and demand new 
trucks and buses. The Soviet Union kept 
providing them. All of this infrastructure, 
while necessary for more industrialized 
countries, was seen as superfluous and 
mismanaged by the Guineans.71 
 The other economic aid that the 
Soviet Union provided was more in line 
with their stated ally strategy. This was to 
develop normalized trade relations with 
the developing nation, as opposed to 
exploiting them, which occurred under 
the previous colonial regime. For the 
most part, the Soviet Union did not need 
any of the resources that the emerging 
nations provided, and so they were forced 
to buy unneeded commodities. An 
example of this is the Soviet-Ghana 
relationship, where the USSR was 
                                                
71 Atwood, 69. 
pressured by Kwame Nkrumah to 
purchase an inordinately large supply of 
cocoa, Ghana’s largest export.72 Because 
the Soviet economy was centrally 
planned, the Soviets were able to 
purchase it, even though they did not 
need cocoa. In return, they offered deals 
on resources that African states needed 
for development. In Guinea, commodity 
exchanges became the norm. The primary 
example of this occured in 1959, where 
the Soviet Union sold Guinea oil at 
hugely discounted prices.73 In 1961, total 
trade between Guinea and the Soviet 
Union was valued at 28.3 million rubles, 
no small sum.74 The logic was that these 
nations would be so overwhelmed with 
gratitude that they would have to listen to 
the Marxist ideas that the Soviet Union 
espoused. In reality, they did not, which 
significantly affected the efficacy of the 
economic programs. 
 These programs were expensive 
and frustrating for the Soviet Union. 
Many critics of this policy argued that the 
Soviet Union was unable and unprepared 
to offer this level of economic aid. 
However, these critics are incorrect. The 
Soviet Union was able to provide large 
amounts of money to Sub-Saharan 
Africa, but the money was spent on 
projects that were unnecessary. Because 
the Soviet Union was so focused on 
trying to establish a socialist foothold in 
Africa, they were willing to pay for any 
project that would help Sub-Saharan 
Africa develop. 
 
How Aid Affected Ideology 
 In its quest to help these 
developing nations, the Soviet Union 
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had a lot of problems in their method of 
distributing this aid. First, the perception 
from these developing nations was that 
the Soviet Union was unable and 
unprepared to provide the type and 
amount of aid that most of these 
countries required. For example, the 
Soviet Union offered extensive aid to 
Congo but in reality only provided 15 
transport planes and a few shipments of 
small arms for the civil war.75 In Guinea, 
the aid that they did provide was 
mismanaged.  
The Soviet Union was also 
accused of favoring only certain factions 
within developing nations. This 
favoritism estranged the USSR from the 
bureaucracy that propped up leaders like 
Nkrumah in Ghana and Touré in 
Guinea. In November 1963, the Soviet 
Union provided Somalia with $30 
million in military aid, but was intent on 
distributing that aid only to Marxist-
Leninist organizations.76 This belief that 
guerrilla organizations should be 
controlled by Communist elements not 
only was disputed by Soviet allies Cuba 
and China, but it also had the 
unfortunate effect of pushing radicalizing 
nationalist movements away from the 
Soviet Union. Because military and 
economic aid was provided with 
conditions to move to a socialist system, 
leaders like Nkrumah in Ghana and 
Touré in Guinea “adopted party and 
                                                
75Bruce Porter. The USSR in Third World Conflicts. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 
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76 Jeffrey LeFebvre. “The United States, Ethiopia, 
and the 1963 Somali-Soviet Arms Deal: 
containment and the balance of power dilemma 
in the Horn of Africa.” The Journal of Modern 
African Studies, 36, 4 (1998), 
http://www.jstor.org/view/0022278x/ap010143/
01a00050/0 
state structures and embarked upon 
economic policies that resembled those 
of the Soviet Union.”77 These structures 
tended to be authoritarian rather than 
socialist; however, the Soviet Union 
viewed these as positive steps forward to 
establishing a future socialist regime. 
Unfortunately, when the USSR 
continued to press for change, they were 
rebuked. Many of these leaders who had 
studied at the African Institute in 
Moscow increasingly began to view the 
Soviet Union as part of the problem, 
rather than a solution to the unique 
circumstances of post-colonial 
development. Marxist-Leninist socialism 
did not account for a tribal and religious 
social hierarchy, and many of these 
leaders felt that Soviet doctrine could not 
apply to them.78 
 After the fall of Khrushchev in 
1964, it was evident that the Soviet 
Union had not solidified connections 
with the entire nationalist movement in 
each country, which hurt them 
disastrously. After the fall of Khrushchev, 
many of the leaders in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, like Nkrumah in Ghana in 1966, 
were also overthrown.79 The national 
liberation movements for the most part 
severed all ties with the USSR, and the 
Soviet Union now understood that these 
allies were not reliable. After these 
downfalls, the USSR pulled back from 
Sub-Saharan Africa until the early 1970s; 
Khrushchev’s successor, Leonid 
Brezhnev, was not keen on repeating 
previous mistakes. Even though many 
nations, including Guinea, Congo, 
Ghana, and Mali, all followed the 
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Communist path for a while, 
Khrushchev’s policies were considered in 
both the USSR and the developing world 
to be too idealistic and unsustainable. As 
opposed to other regions of the world, 
notably Southeast Asia, Sub-Saharan 
Africa was unwilling to accept aid on 
conditions of change to a Marxist-
Leninist system during Khrushchev’s 
tenure. 
 
Conclusions 
 Soviet policy towards the 
developing world during Nikita 
Khrushchev’s tenure is often cited as 
being too optimistic and too idealistic. 
The ideology was there- Soviet 
policymakers were initially excited at the 
prospects of multiple new communist 
allies in the developing world. However, 
the ideology that the Soviets espoused 
was seen as part of the problem, rather 
than a solution, to the problems in Sub-
Saharan Africa. The Soviet Union did 
not stress race and religion as major 
obstacles to developing class 
consciousness, and their inability to 
recognize these powerful forces hastened 
their exit from the region. Khrushchev 
was very optimistic that these regimes 
would be overwhelmed with gratitude; 
instead, they took advantage of Soviet 
generosity. As opposed to embracing the 
aid that the Soviet Union provided, the 
nations took the aid and either 
completely ignored the ideology or played 
the Soviet Union off of the United 
States. Neither of these outcomes were 
particularly desired by the Soviet Union, 
and by the time Khrushchev was ousted 
in 1964, the Soviet Union was frustrated 
and cut off much of their aid to the 
region. This aid would not return until 
the mid-1970s. 
 In the developing world, the 
leaders who took advantage of Soviet aid 
did not do much better. After 
Khrushchev left in 1964, the previously 
favored leaders of Guinea, Ghana, and 
other nations were deposed. This was 
primarily because the Soviet Union 
focused on courting the individual 
leaders of these movements, rather than 
the majority of the members in the 
unions. As exemplified by Cuba, the 
latter strategy worked much better, but it 
was untenable for the Soviet Union, 
especially considering the potentially 
larger consequences of global war. The 
Soviet Union was not willing to risk 
global war, and this unwillingness 
translated to less aid for these regimes. 
Consequently, Khrushchev was surprised 
when these regimes were not open to 
Soviet ideology. 
 All in all, there were a few major 
weaknesses in the Soviet plan to develop 
socialist regimes in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
The first was unrealistic expectations 
from nations which had barely had a 
chance to develop national identity, let 
alone class consciousness. The second 
was restraining their aid, which as a result 
affected local politicians’ decisions to 
implement socialist reforms. The final 
weakness was an inability on 
Khrushchev’s part to recognize these key 
failures. As a result, the Soviet Union lost 
a lot of potential political capital with 
these nations. All of these weaknesses 
were detrimental to the 
Soviet Union and the emerging nations 
themselves.
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